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Abstract
This paper studies how encouraging semantically-aligned features during deep
neural network training can increase network robustness. Recent works observed
that Adversarial Training leads to robust models, whose learnt features appear
to correlate with human perception. Inspired by this connection from robustness
to semantics, we study the complementary connection: from semantics to ro-
bustness. To do so, we provide a tight robustness certificate for distance-based
classification models (clustering-based classifiers), which we leverage to propose
ClusTR (Clustering Training for Robustness), a clustering-based and adversary-free
training framework to learn robust models. Interestingly, ClusTR outperforms
adversarially-trained networks by up to 4% under strong PGD attacks. Moreover,
it can be equipped with simple and fast adversarial training to improve the current
state-of-the-art in robustness by 16%-29% on CIFAR10, SVHN, and CIFAR100.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated tremendous success in various fields, from computer
vision [22, 23] and reinforcement learning [30, 29] to natural language processing [3, 44] and
speech recognition [15]. Despite this breakthrough in performance, robustness is becoming a rising
concern in DNNs. Specifically, DNNs have been shown to be vulnerable to imperceptible input
perturbations [41, 12], known as adversarial attacks, which can entirely alter their output. This
vulnerability has popularized a new line of research known as network robustness. Robust DNNs
should not only be accurate, but also resilient against input perturbations. Given the importance of
the problem, a plethora of network robustness approaches have been proposed, including those based
on regularization [6, 49, 31, 18], distillation [34], and feature denoising [47] among many others. In
this paper, we focus our attention on the popular and effective adversarial training approach [25].
Adversarial training explicitly trains DNNs on adversarial attacks generated on-the-fly through
projected gradient descent (PGD). This technique has proven to significantly improve network
robustness, and has become a standard for training robust networks. Interestingly, and as a byproduct,
adversarially-trained networks seem to learn features that are more semantically-aligned with human
perception [9, 8], to such a degree that the learnt DNNs can be used for several image synthesis tasks
[37]. The existence of a connection from robustness to semantics raises an interesting dual question:
While adversarial robustness can encourage more semantically-aligned priors on learnt DNN
features, can one conversely achieve network robustness by encouraging the learnt features to be
more semantically-aligned?
Learning more semantically-aligned features in DNNs remains an open problem. A promising direc-
tion for obtaining features with such properties is through Deep Metric Learning (DML) techniques.
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Figure 1: Closing the loop on robustness and semantics. Earlier work showed that adversarial
training results in more semantically-aligned features, i.e. features of same-class instances tend to
cluster together (left figure). We study the complementary path, i.e. the effect of learning more
semantically-aligned features (via clustering) on network robustness (right figure).
DML learns feature representations by preserving a notion of similarity between inputs and their
feature representations [16, 33], and has achieved remarkable performance in face recognition [39],
image retrieval [11], and zero-shot learning [10]. The preservation of similarity that DML seeks often
involves clustering semantically-similar instances. Hence, recent clustering-based losses [16, 36]
have been designed with this objective in mind, showing significant progress in learning semantic
representations that are also competitive in performance with modern classification approaches.
Inspired by these developments, we theoretically show an intimate relation between semantics
(through clustering approaches) and robustness, as illustrated in Figure 1. In particular, we show that,
under certain continuity properties of the DNN, clustering-based classifiers enjoy a tight robustness
radius against `2-bounded input perturbations. Furthermore, we observe that this radius can be
maximized by optimizing a Clustering Loss, i.e. a loss that encourages clustering of semantically-
similar instances in feature space. Inspired by this observation, we show that training DNNs with
such a loss results in high-performing and robust classifiers. We enhance this clustering-based
approach with standard techniques for DNN training, and dub this framework Clustering Training for
Robustness (ClusTR). To validate the idea behind ClusTR, we experiment on several datasets and find
that ClusTR can yield significant robustness gains. In summary, our contributions are three-fold:
1. We study the connection from semantics to robustness by analyzing classifiers that employ
clustering in representation space. We use this analysis to derive a tight `2 robustness radius,
under which all `2 perturbations are unable to change the classifier’s predictions. Moreover,
we show that a deep metric learning approach for semantic clustering that optimizes a
Clustering Loss is directly related to maximizing the derived robustness radius.
2. Motivated by our theoretical findings, we propose the ClusTR framework, which employs a
popular Clustering Loss (the Magnet Loss [36]), to learn robust models without generating
adversaries during training. We validate the theory behind ClusTR through extensive experi-
ments and find that ClusTR results in a significant boost in robustness without relying on
adversarial training. Specifically, we observe that classifiers learnt using ClusTR outperform
(in robustness) adversarially-trained classifiers [40] by 3% and 4% under strong 8/255 PGD
attacks on the CIFAR10 [21] and SVHN [32] datasets, respectively.
3. We show that equipping ClusTR with a quick and cheap version of adversarial training
can increase state-of-the-art robustness results against 8/255 PGD attacks on CIFAR10,
CIFAR100, and SVHN benchmarks by 16%, 18%, and 29%, respectively. Interestingly, our
proposed pipeline achieves this substantial improvement in robustness, while being at least
4× faster in training than the current state-of-the-art. Lastly, we evaluate ClusTR-trained
DNNs against adaptive attacks, showing consistent improvements over the state-of-the-art2.
2Our code can be found at github.com/clustr-official-account/ClusTR-Clustering-Training-For-Robustness.
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2 Related Work
Adversarial Robustness. The existence of adversarial perturbations has dramatically increased
security concerns in DNNs. Consequently, there has been a surge of research aiming at learning
adversarially-robust models [4, 24, 6]. Despite its high computational cost, adversarial training [25]
remains one of the most popular, successful and reliable techniques for attaining adversarial robustness.
Furthermore, adversarial training was regularized by enforcing similarity between logits of both
natural and adversarial pairs [18]. This work was further developed in TRADES [49], a framework
that uses a theoretically-motivated loss resulting in large robustness gains. Moreover, regularization
also studied the data-complexity perspective, demonstrating an inherent sample complexity barrier
on robust learning [38], and that pre-training or learning from unlabeled data can vastly improve
robustness of adversarially-trained networks [14, 5]. In this work, we tackle robustness from a
complementary view, mainly by studying the effect of clustering-based classifiers on robustness.
Robust Features. Recent work demonstrated that networks trained adversarially enjoy an unexpected
benefit: the learnt features tend to align with salient data characteristics and human perception [43].
Moreover, the learnt features, commonly referred to as robust features [17], seem to be clustered
in feature space, while being perceptually aligned [9]. Based on these findings, the power of such
semantically-aligned features was harnessed to perform image synthesis tasks with a single robust
classifier [37]. In this paper, we take an orthogonal direction to robustness, in which we encourage
robustness by training DNNs to specifically learn more semantically-aligned features via clustering.
Metric Learning. The idea of encouraging learnt features to be more semantically meaningful to the
human visual system has been extensively studied in the metric learning community, where the goal
is to learn a similarity measure in feature space that correlates with a similarity measure between
inputs [48, 45, 16, 19]. In such a setting, semantically-similar inputs (e.g. those belonging to the
same class) are expected to be clustered together. This paradigm has shown remarkable performance
in several tasks [39, 28, 11]. Closely related to our work, the approach of [26] used the Triplet
Loss [39] to regularize learnt features and enhance network robustness. We complement the previous
art with a theoretical justification on the intimate relation between robustness and the general family
of metric-learning classifiers that subsumes the Triplet Loss as a special case. Namely, we find a
connection between the Magnet Loss [36] and theoretical guarantees of network robustness.
3 From Robustness to Clustering Loss
Recent work has shown that adversarially-trained DNNs, while robust, also tend to learn more
semantically-aligned features [43, 9]. Inspired by these findings, we are interested in studying the
converse implication, i.e. whether DNNs trained to learn such features enjoy robustness properties.
To this end, we start by studying the robustness of a common family of classifiers used in deep metric
learning [16, 36], namely classifiers that are based on clustering semantically-similar inputs.
3.1 Robustness
Clustering-based classifiers. Consider a training set consisting of input-label pairsD = {xi, yi}Ni=1,
where xi ∈ Rn belongs to one of L classes, and a parameterized function fθ : Rn → Rd, which can
be a DNN. A clustering-based classifier learns parameters θ such that fθ clusters semantically-similar
inputs xi (inputs with similar labels yi) in feature space Rd. That is, fθ clusters each of the L
classes into K different clusters (K may vary across classes). Hence, an input xi is assigned a
label c, if and only if, fθ(xi) is closest, under some notion of distance, to one of the K clusters
representing class c. To analyze the robustness of such classifiers, and without loss of generality,
we consider a binary classification problem, where inputs belong to one of two classes, C1 or C2,
and each class is represented with a single cluster center, i.e. L = 2 and K = 1. Let the cluster
centers of C1 and C2 be µ1 and µ2, respectively, in Rd. Thus, xi is classified as C1, if and only if,
‖fθ(xi)− µ1‖ < ‖fθ(xi)− µ2‖, and as C2 otherwise. Throughout this paper, we assume that fθ is
Lf -Lipschitz continuous [6]: ‖fθ(x)− fθ(y)‖ ≤ Lf ‖x− y‖, where ‖ · ‖ denotes the `2 norm.
We are interested in the maximum norm of an input perturbation δ such that the clustering-based
binary classifier assigns the same class to both x and (x + δ). The following theorem provides a
bound on such a δ, denoted the robustness radius. The detailed proof is left for the Appendix.
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Figure 2: Illustration of Theorem 1. For a classifier f trained with a Clustering Loss, an instance
x is classified by assigning it to the class of the closest cluster to its feature representation f(x).
The resulting decision boundaries form a Voronoi diagram in feature space. As a consequence, the
robustness radius in Theorem 1 is proportional to the distance to the decision boundary separating the
two closest clusters to f(x).
Theorem 1. Consider the clustering-based binary classifier that classifies x as class C1, i.e. ‖fθ(x)−
µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖, with Lf -Lipschitz fθ. The classifier output for the perturbed input (x+ δ) will
not differ from x, i.e. ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ2‖, for all perturbations δ that satisfy:
‖δ‖ < ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖
2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2
2Lf‖µ2 − µ1‖ . (1)
Proof Sketch. It suffices to observe that the clustering-based classifier is equivalent to a linear classifier,
operating in representation space, defined by the hyperplane (µ1 − µ2)>(fθ(x) − (µ2+µ1)/2) = 0.
The result is deduced from the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the Lipschitz continuity property of
fθ, where the bound is proportional to the `2 distance to the hyperplane, as illustrated in Figure 2.
It is to be observed that the robustness radius is agnostic to the choice of µ1 and µ2. That is to say,
the robustness radius in Theorem 1 is not concerned with the accuracy of the classifier, but only with
changes in the prediction under input perturbations. Therefore, the cluster centers µ1 and µ2 are
often learnt jointly along with the classifier parameters θ, such that the feature representations of
inputs belonging to class C1 are close to some learnt µ1, while being far from the cluster center µ2
representing the other class. Note that if the clustering is performed with K-means, then the cluster
centers are the average features belonging to that class, i.e. µi = 1/|Ci|
∑
xj∈Ci fθ(xj).
Generalization to the Multi-Class Multi-Cluster Setting. We first consider the multi-class single-
cluster case, i.e. L ≥ 2, K = 1, where each class is represented by a single cluster center µi, as
depicted in Figure 2. Analyzing the robustness around an input x in this case is equivalent to analyzing
the previously discussed binary classification case with respect to the two closest cluster centers i.e.
µ1 = µi∗ = argmini∈{1,...,L} ‖f(x) − µi‖ and µ2 = µj∗ = argmini∈{1,...,L}/{i∗} ‖f(x) − µi‖.
For the multi-class multi-cluster case, where µi,j denotes the jth cluster of the ith class, it is
sufficient to analyze the binary case between the closest cluster centers of two different classes.
In this case, µ1 = µi∗,j∗ = argmini∈{1,...,L},j∈{1,...,K} ‖f(x) − µi,j‖ and µ2 = µk∗,l∗ =
argmini∈{1,...,L}/{i∗},j∈{1,...,K} ‖f(x)− µi,j‖. We leave the rest of the details for the Appendix.
3.2 Clustering Loss as a Robustness Regularizer
Theorem 1 provides a tight3 robustness radius for each input. So, to attain both accurate and
robust models, one can train DNNs to achieve accuracy, while simultaneously maximizing the
robustness radius in Theorem 1 for every training input x. Several observations can be made about
the robustness radius. First, it is inversely proportional to the DNN’s Lipschitz constant Lf , i.e.
networks with smaller Lf tend to enjoy better robustness. This is consistent with previous work that
exploited this observation to enhance network robustness [6]. In this paper, we focus on the term
‖fθ(x)−µ2‖2−‖fθ(x)−µ1‖2, and on learning parameters θ to maximize it, i.e. to push features far
from cluster centers of different classes (µ2) and to pull features closer to cluster centers of their class
(µ1). As such, a general class of robustness-based clustering losses can be formulated as follows:
3Formal tightness analysis of the bound developed in Theorem 1 is included in the Appendix.
4
LRobustClustering =
1
N
N∑
i=1
H
(
F
(
fθ(xi), {µci,j}Kj=1
)
,G
(
fθ(xi), {µv 6=ci,j}Kj=1
))
, (2)
where ci = C(xi) is the class to which xi belongs. The function F measures the separation between
the feature of xi, i.e. fθ(xi), and the cluster centers of its class. Similarly, G measures the separation
between fθ(xi) and the cluster centers of all other classes. The function H combines the two
measurements in an overall stable loss, so that minimization of the loss incites larger values for the
numerator in Theorem 1. Note that iterative optimization of this loss requires updating θ. Hence,
after every update, cluster centers µi,j can be recomputed by any clustering algorithm, e.g. K-means.
Moreover, many losses commonly used in the deep metric learning literature [27] conform with
Equation (2) as special cases, one of which is the popular Magnet Loss defined as:
LMagnetClustering =
1
N
N∑
i=1
α+ 12σ2 ‖fθ(xi)− µ(xi)‖2 + log
 K∑
j=1
∑
v 6=c
e−
1
2σ2
‖fθ(xi)−µv,j‖2

+
(3)
where {x}+ = max(0, x), σ2 = 1N−1
∑N
i=1 ‖f(xi)− µ(xi)‖2, and α ≥ 0. While the Magnet Loss
was introduced to address performance issues in metric learning algorithms, our objective of learning
more semantically-aligned features and our subsequent analysis of Theorem 1 suggest that this loss
inherently encourages robustness. Regarding inference, DNNs trained with Magnet Loss predict the
class of a test input by computing a soft probability over the features fθ as follows:
Pr(C(x) = c) = pc(fθ(x)) =
∑K
j=1 e
− 1
2σ2
‖fθ(x)−µc,j‖2∑K
j=1
∑L
v=1 e
− 1
2σ2
‖fθ(x)−µv,j‖2 . (4)
Hence, x is assigned to class argmaxc pc(fθ(x)). We refer the reader to [36] for more details. Next,
we introduce ClusTR, a simple framework for training robust models based on our analytical findings.
3.3 ClusTR: Clustering Training for Robustness
Our theoretical study finds an intrinsic connection between clustering and robustness: clustering-
based classifiers intrinsically possess a robustness radius. As such, optimizing a loss designed for
clustering tends to maximize this robustness radius. We also observe that a Clustering Loss such as
Equation (2), which is designed to induce robustness according to Theorem 1, can be reduced to the
Magnet Loss of Equation (3) as a special case. Based on these observations, we propose Clustering
Training for Robustness (ClusTR): a simple and theoretically-motivated framework for inducing
robustness during DNN training without the need to generate adversaries. ClusTR exploits our
theoretical findings by combining a Clustering Loss with simple DNN training techniques. For the
Clustering Loss, ClusTR incorporates the well-studied Magnet Loss to induce semantic clustering of
instances in feature space. Although effective in its task, this loss suffers from slow convergence [36].
ClusTR mitigates this issue by introducing a simple warm start initialization. For a given model and
dataset, ClusTR first conducts nominal training, i.e. standard Cross Entropy training, until reasonable
performance is achieved. Then, it removes the last linear layer and fine-tunes the resulting DNN by
applying the Magnet Loss on the output of the penultimate layer. The Magnet Loss in ClusTR aims at
optimizing the robustness radius of Theorem 1, while using a warm start initialization to increase
convergence speed without hindering test set accuracy. In this work, we choose the Magnet Loss to
be the Clustering Loss in ClusTR. However, the result in Theorem 1 is agnostic to this choice, so we
expect our results to extend to other choices of Clustering Loss.
4 Experiments
In this section, we conduct several experiments on synthetic and real datasets to validate the idea
behind ClusTR. Specifically, we study (a) the effect of warm start on convergence speed and
robustness, (b) how ClusTR-trained DNNs compare to adversarially-trained counterparts, and (c) how
ClusTR can be equipped with a quick version of adversarial training to further enhance robustness.
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Figure 3: Effect of warm start on certified accuracy. Figures (a)-(c) show the synthetic datasets,
while Figures (b)-(d) show the effect of warm start in ClusTR on certified accuracy. In both datasets,
warm start induces a larger robustness radius than training Magnet Loss with random initialization.
4.1 Effect of warm start Initialization in ClusTR
Convergence. We assess the training convergence and the overall test accuracy performance for
our proposed ClusTR-training of ResNet18 on CIFAR10 and SVHN. In CIFAR10, we observe
that training without warm start (i.e. Magnet Loss only) requires 106 minutes to fully train, while
introducing the warm start reduces the required training time to 83 minutes on a GTX 1080Ti GPU.
Robustness. We study the effect of the warm start initialization on robustness by conducting
controlled synthetic experiments and computing exact robustness radii. We train a 3-layered neural
network with 20 hidden units on the synthetic binary classification datasets depicted in Figures 3(a)
and (c). On both datasets, we train (1) Magnet Loss with random initialization and (2) ClusTR. For
simplicity, each class is represented with a single cluster, i.e. K = 1. Upon convergence, both models
achieve 99% accuracy. Given model predictions, we compute the robustness radius for each instance
and report certified accuracy under varying radius r in Figures 3(b) and (d). This is in line with
common practice in the network certification literature [7]. Note that certified accuracy at radius r is
defined as the percentage of instances that are both correctly classified and have a robustness radius
larger than r, as given by Theorem 1. We find that the ClusTR-trained DNNs, while accurate, also
enjoy a larger robustness radius than DNNs trained with Magnet Loss without the warm start.
4.2 ClusTR Robustness and Comparison with State-of-the-Art
Setup and Implementation Details. In this section, we conduct experiments with ResNet18 on the
CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and SVHN datasets. We train models using our proposed ClusTR framework.
Specifically, we first conduct nominal training until we get a reasonable performance4. We then
remove the last linear layer and fine-tune the network by applying the Magnet Loss on the output
feature of the remaining DNN. Fine-tuning is done for 30 epochs on CIFAR10 and SVHN, and 60
epochs on CIFAR100. Following [36], we use k-means++ [1] to update cluster centers after each
training epoch. To assess model robustness, we follow prior work and perform projected gradient
descent (PGD) [25] attacks with -`∞-bounded perturbations that take the following form:
max
δ
Lce(p(fθ(x+ δ)), y) s.t. ‖δ‖∞ ≤  ⇒ xk+1 =
∏
S
(
xk + η sign
(∇xkLce(p(fθ(xk)), y))) ,
where
∏
S(x + δ) denotes the projection of the perturbed input onto the set S = {(x + δ) ∈
[0, 1]n, ‖δ‖∞ ≤ }, p(fθ(x)) is the probability prediction vector computed from Equation (4), and
Lce is the Cross Entropy loss. In all experiments, we perform PGD attacks with 10 random restarts
around each input for 20 and 100 iterations, denoted by PGD20 and PGD100, respectively. Following
common practice in the literature [40, 46], we set the PGD step size to η = 2/255. We report the
attacks with  = 8/255 and leave experiments with other choices of  for the Appendix.
Experiments on CIFAR10 and SVHN. We evaluate the robustness of nominal training (as baseline),
the Magnet Loss (i.e. ClusTR without warm start), and ClusTR, and we compare against several
approaches that achieve state-of-art robustness in this experimental setup, namely Free adversarial
training (Free AT) [40] with its reported best setting of 8 minibatch-replays that outperforms vanilla
adversarial training [25], Adversarial Training with ImageNet pre-training (AT + PreTraining) that
4Models with test accuracies 90%, 75%, 90% on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN, respectively.
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Table 1: Adversarial accuracy comparison on CIFAR10 and SVHN. We compare ClusTR and
ClusTR+QTRADES against Magnet Loss, Free Adversarial Training (Free AT), AT with ImageNet
pre-training, TRADES, and QTRADES under  = 8/255 PGD attacks. ClusTR+QTRADES outper-
forms the adversarially-trained state-of-the-art by a large margin. All numbers are percentages.
CIFAR10 SVHN
Natural PGD20 PGD100 Natural PGD20 PGD100
Nominal Training 95.01 0.00 0.00 98.38 0.00 0.00
Free AT [40] 85.96 46.33 46.19 86.98 46.52 46.06
AT + Pre-Training [14] 87.30 57.40 57.20 85.12 47.18 46.72
TRADES [49] 84.92 56.61 56.43 91.63 57.45 55.28
Magnet Loss [36] 83.14 23.71 22.54 91.95 40.73 38.59
ClusTR 87.34 49.04 47.76 94.28 50.78 50.77
QTRADES 81.07 44.18 43.42 86.36 43.05 42.24
ClusTR + QTRADES 91.03 74.44 74.04 95.06 84.76 84.75
Table 2: Comparison of training time on CIFAR10. ClusTR boosts the convergence speed of
Magnet Loss training through warm start. Note that CLUSTR+QTRADES is faster than both
TRADES and Free AT, and that QTRADES is 10× faster than TRADES. Training time is computed
on the same workstation using the same software platform (PyTorch [35]) and GPU (GTX 1080Ti).
Free AT TRADES QTRADES Magnet ClusTR ClusTR+QTRADES
Time (min.) 147 534 42 106 83 115
leverages external data to improve robustness, and TRADES [49], the current state-of-the-art method.
Note that all the robustness methods in this comparison employ various forms of adversarial training.
We evaluate using both natural accuracy, i.e. test set accuracy on clean images, and PGD test
accuracy. Table 1 reports these results. First, we observe that training with Magnet Loss only on
clean images results in substantial gains in robustness compared to nominal training. In fact, this loss
increases PGD20 accuracy from 0% to 23.71%, while natural accuracy drops from 95.01% to 83.14%.
This result constitutes empirical evidence of the theoretical robustness properties we presented for
clustering-based classifiers. Furthermore, training with ClusTR consistently outperforms Free AT in
both natural and PGD accuracy for both CIFAR10 and SVHN. Specifically, ClusTR outperforms Free
AT in PGD20 accuracy by 3% and 4% on CIFAR10 and SVHN, respectively, even though the former
only trains with clean images. We note that ClusTR’s robustness gains over adversarial training are
not accompanied with lower natural accuracy. In fact, the natural accuracy of ClusTR is 1% more in
CIFAR10 and 7% more in SVHN.
These results show that the design of ClusTR inherently provides robustness properties without intro-
ducing adversaries during training. We complement this finding by studying the following question:
Can equipping ClusTR with some form of adversarial training provide even more robustness? To do
so, we equip ClusTR with a TRADES loss term, where the total loss becomes:
LTotal = LMagnetClustering + λLce(p(fθ(xadv)), p(fθ(x))). (5)
Note that the Cross Entropy based TRADES formulation [49] is similar to Equation (5), but with
the first term replaced with Lce(p(fθ(x)), y), where p(fθ(x)) is the output logits of the last linear
layer and y is the true label. In order to keep the framework simple and computationally efficient,
we compute a quick estimate of the adversary xadv in Equation (5). Namely, we start from a random
uniform initialization and perform a single PGD step as opposed to TRADES’ multiple iterations.
We refer to this setup as QTRADES5. Formally, for an input x, we construct an adversarial input by
perturbing x with uniform noise, i.e. x′ = x+ U(−, ), and then generate xadv by:
xadv =
∏
S
(x′ + η sign (∇x′Lce(p(fθ(x′)), p(fθ(x))))) .
While QTRADES alone only achieves slightly lower natural accuracy and robustness as compared
to Free AT, Table 1 shows that equipping ClusTR with QTRADES sets new state-of-art robustness
5The rest of the implementation details of QTRADES are left for the Appendix.
7
Table 3: Adversarial accuracy on CIFAR100. We compare ClusTR+QTRADES against Free AT,
AT+Pre-Training, and TRADES under  = 8/255 PGD attacks. Our proposed ClusTR+QTRADES
framework surpasses all competition by a large margin. All numbers are percentages.
CIFAR100
Natural PGD20 PGD100
Nominal Training 78.84 0.00 0.00
Free AT [40] 62.13 25.88 25.58
AT+Pre-Training [14] 59.23 34.22 33.91
TRADES [49] 55.36 28.11 27.96
ClusTR+QTRADES 69.25 52.47 52.40
results on both datasets, outperforming all other methods. We observe that ClusTR+QTRADES
achieves the highest natural accuracy among all methods with 91.03% and 95.06%, on CIFAR10
and SVHN respectively, thus improving upon the best competitor by 4% on both datasets. Also,
ClusTR+QTRADES surpasses current state-of-art methods by impressive margins: 16.84% and
29.47% under strong PGD attacks on CIFAR10 and SVHN, respectively.
Experiments on CIFAR100. We extend our analysis of ClusTR+QTRADES to CIFAR100, and
assess robustness with  = 8/255 attacks. We report the results of this setup in Table 3, which shows
that ClusTR+QTRADES significantly outperforms the strongest competitor by 18.25%, thus setting
a new state-of-art robustness result on CIFAR100. We note that these large gains in robustness also
come with a substantial 7% increase in natural accuracy. For CIFAR100, the total number of clusters
is 100 (classes)× 2 (clusters per class) = 200. Following how [36] tackles the large-cluster-number
regime, ClusTR+QTRADES inference in this case does not consider all clusters, as in Equation (4),
but only the D nearest clusters. While we take D = 20 in this experiment, we find that the choice of
D has marginal impact on robustness. We leave a comprehensive ablation of D for the Appendix.
Adaptive Attacks. While going against the current paradigm in network robustness literature, it
has been argued that PGD attacks are insufficient to demonstrate network robustness. Recent work
shows that many defenses can be broken with carefully-crafted attacks [2], dubbed adaptive attacks,
tailored to break the underlying defense [42]. Therefore, we construct an example of a potential
powerful attack tailored to our trained networks. Namely, we construct adversaries that maximize
the LMagnetClustering loss as opposed to the cross entropy loss in PGD. Similar to previous experiments, the
attacks are performed with 10 random restarts for 100 iterations and  = 8/255. Note that this attack
precisely targets the objective, with which our models are trained, thus, the attack is expected to be
stronger. Indeed, running this adaptive attack lowers the robustness accuracy from 74.04% to 66.52%
on CIFAR10, and from 84.75% to 78.79% on SVHN. Despite this drop, our ClusTR+QTRADES
approach still outperforms the state-of-the-art by a substantial margin. It is essential to note here that
this drop in robustness is considered to be rather marginal, as other defenses, when subjected to such
tailored attacks, have their robustness drop close to 0, or lower than baseline robust models [42, 2].
Training Time. We report the training time of the previous methods in Table 2. We note that
ClusTR+QTRADES outperforms Free AT and TRADES both in terms of robustness and training
time. The speedup is owed to two factors. First, the warm start initialization boosts the convergence of
ClusTR compared to Magnet Loss. Second, QTRADES delivered its promises in being very efficient
(10× faster than TRADES). We leave the training time comparison on SVHN to the Appendix.
It is worthwhile to mention that our choice of QTRADES, out of the many adversarial training
schemes with which ClusTR can be equipped, is motivated by (i) the theoretical support behind
TRADES [49] and (ii) QTRADES’ low computational cost. We also emphasize here that robustness
could possibly be improved further by incorporating another adversarial training technique with
ClusTR instead of QTRADES. We leave the search for this optimal choice for future work.
5 Conclusion
Inspired by work that observed a connection from robustness to semantics, this paper explores
the complementary connection: from semantics to robustness. We showed that clustering-based
classifiers inherently enjoy a tight robustness radius against input perturbations and this radius can
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be maximized by clustering semantically-similar instances in representation space. Motivated by
these findings, we proposed ClusTR (Clustering Training for Robustness), a simple and theoretically-
motivated framework for learning robust models without generating adversaries in training. Extensive
experiments validated the theory motivating ClusTR and showed that ClusTR can achieve network
robustness that is superior to adversarially-trained models. ClusTR can also be equipped with a quick
version of adversarial training to set new state-of-the-art robustness results against strong adversarial
attacks on three benchmark datasets, while also maintaining a training time that is more than 4×
faster than the current state-of-the-art robust training method.
6 Broader Impact
While the current performance of deep learning algorithms is unparalleled in several fields, the
existence of adversarial examples hinders the inclusion of deep learning as a component in security-
critical applications. This issue prevents industrial applications from safely including deep learning
in systems related to autonomous cars, computer-aided surgical procedures and healthcare, among
others, as deep learning components would constitute a security liability to potential malicious attacks.
Hence, approaches addressing the robustness of deep learning, such as the one studied in this work,
can make these algorithms more reliable, allowing the inclusion of powerful deep learning systems,
and so permitting applications to enjoy their great performance. On the other hand, the addressing
of adversarial robustness could prevent the usage of this security leak as a protection against deep
learning systems designed with malicious intent.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Consider the clustering-based binary classifier that classifies x as class C1, i.e. ‖fθ(x)−
µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖, with Lf -Lipschitz fθ. The classifier output for the perturbed input (x+ δ) will
not differ from x, i.e. ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ2‖, for all perturbations δ that satisfy:
‖δ‖ < ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖
2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2
2Lf‖µ2 − µ1‖ .
Proof. It suffices that ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖2 < ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ2‖2 for x+ δ to be classified as C1.
‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖2
= ‖fθ(x+ δ)− fθ(x) + fθ(x)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x+ δ)− fθ(x) + fθ(x)− µ1‖2
= ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2 + 2〈fθ(x+ δ)− fθ(x), µ1 − µ2〉
≥ ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2 − 2L‖δ‖‖µ2 − µ1‖.
(6)
The inequality follows by Cauchy Schwarz and the Lipschitz of fθ, i.e.
−L‖δ‖‖µ2 − µ1‖ ≤ |〈fθ(x+ δ)− fθ(x), µ1 − µ2〉| ≤ L‖δ‖‖µ2 − µ1‖.
Thus, by rearranging the inequality in 6, the bound on ‖δ‖ stated in the Theorem guarantees ‖fθ(x+
δ)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖2 > 0, completing the proof.
A.1 Generalization to multi-class multi-cluster case
The analysis that leads to Theorem 1, based on the single-cluster binary classification problem (K = 1
and L = 2), can be extended to the multi-cluster multi-class case (K ≥ 1 and L ≥ 2). This extension
is achieved by reducing the multi-class multi-cluster case to the single-cluster binary classification
problem we studied. Namely, denote by µi,j the jth cluster of the ith class, and select the centroids µ1
and µ2 as follows:
µ1 = µi∗,j∗ = arg min
i∈{1,...,L},j∈{1,...,K}
‖fθ(x)− µi,j‖
and
µ2 = µk∗,l∗ = arg min
i∈{1,...,L}/{i∗},j∈{1,...,K}
‖fθ(x)− µi,j‖
These assignments state that: (i) the selected centroids are from different class, hence fooling the
classifier is well-defined, and (ii) the centroids are the two nearest centroids to fθ(x) that are from
different classes.
B Decision Boundaries as a Voronoi Diagram
Here, we show that the decision boundaries of such a classifier forms Voronoi diagram that is
constructed around the cluster centers. Following the earlier notation, and for the multi-class
classifier, where each class i is clustered in a single cluster with the center µi, one can characterize
the decision boundaries between each two classes i and j as follows:
B = {x : ‖f(x)− µi‖ = ‖f(x)− µj‖, i 6= j}
which is precisely the definition of the Voronoi diagram for the metric space (Rd, ‖.‖2) over the
cluster centers µ1 and µ2.
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C Tightness Analysis.
Proposition 1. Consider the clustering-based binary classifier that classifies x as class C1, i.e.
‖fθ(x)− µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖, with Lf -Lipschitz fθ. If
‖δ‖ > ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖
2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2
2Lf‖µ2 − µ1‖ ,
then there exist a direction along which the classifier is fooled, i.e. ‖fθ(x + δ) − µ1‖ > ‖fθ(x +
δ)− µ2‖
Proof. We start by observing that the clustering-based classifier that classifies x as C1 when ‖fθ(x)−
µ1‖ < ‖fθ(x) − µ2‖ and as C2 otherwise, has decision boundaries given by the set B = {x :
‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2 = ‖fθ(x)− µ2‖2}. That is, the clustering-based classifier is equivalent to the linear
classifier, in the feature, (µ2 − µ1)> (µ2+µ1/2− fθ(x)) = 0 such that x is classified as C1 when
(µ2 − µ1)> (µ2+µ1/2− fθ(x)) > 0 and as C2 otherwise. Thus, we have that if x belongs to C1
then it suffices to show that there exists δ, satisfying the norm bound in the proposition, such that
(µ2 − µ1)> (µ2+µ1/2− fθ(x)) ≤ 0 to prove the statement. We have that
(µ2 − µ1)>
(
µ1 + µ2
2
− fθ(x+ δ)
)
=
‖µ2‖2 − ‖µ1‖2
2
− (µ2 − µ1)>fθ(x+ δ)
=
‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x+ δ)− µ1‖2
2
=
‖fθ(x)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2
2
+ (fθ(x+ δ)− fθ(x))>(µ1 − µ2).
(7)
The last equality follows from Equation (6). Now, consider the choice of δ such that fθ(x+δ)−fθ(x)
is in the direction (µ2 − µ1), in particular, fθ(x + δ) − fθ(x) = Lf‖δ‖‖µ2−µ1‖ (µ2 − µ1). Substituting
back in Equation (7), we have:
(µ2 − µ1)>
(
µ1 + µ2
2
− fθ(x+ δ)
)
=
‖fθ(x)− µ2‖2 − ‖fθ(x)− µ1‖2
2
− Lf‖δ‖‖µ2 − µ1‖
Lastly, note that for any δ satisfying the bound in the proposition we have (µ2 −
µ1)
> (µ1+µ2
2 − fθ(x+ δ)
) ≤ 0, i.e. x+ δ is classified as C2 completing the proof.
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D Implementation Details
Next, we describe the implementation details of ClusTR, along with details regarding QTRADES.
Note that the supplementary material zip file includes the implementation reproducing our results.
Architecture. We use a ResNet18 [13] modified to accept 32 × 32 input images. The size of
the output of the network in the penultimate layer, i.e. the feature dimension, is set to 512 for all
experiments.
Optimization. For the warm start stage of training ClusTR, we use the Adam optimizer [20] for 90
epochs with learning rate of 10−2 that is multiplied by 10−1 at epochs 30 and 60 with cross entropy
loss. After that, we fine-tune the DNN with the Magnet Loss with a learning rate of 10−4 for another
30 epochs for CIFAR10 and 60 epochs for CIFAR100 and SVHN.
Pre-processing. Images are normalized by their channel-wise mean and standard deviation. For
CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. We apply standard data augmentation of random 32 × 32 crops with a
padding of 4. For SVHN, we do not employ any data augmentation.
Magnet Loss. Following Rippel et al. [36], we compute a stochastic approximation of the Magnet
Loss. Hence, Magnet Loss training requires sampling neighborhoods of points in representation
space, rather than independent samples. These neighborhoods are defined by a number of clusters
and a number of samples per cluster. This sampling procedure does not guarantee that every instance
will be sampled, nor that an instance shall be sampled only once. Therefore, we define an epoch
as passing as many instances as there are available in the dataset, regardless if some instances were
repeated or some instances were seen more than once. For sampling, we set the total number of
sampled clusters to 12, and the number of samples per cluster to 20. Hence, the total amount of
samples in each batch of each batch is 12× 20 = 240. Cluster assignments are recomputed at the
end of every epoch with the K-means clustering algorithm with the K-means++ initialization. We run
grid search for optimizing the α parameter in the Magnet Loss. We set α to 12.5 for ClusTR and
ClusTR+QTRADES on CIFAR10; to 13 for ClusTR and to 10 for ClusTR+QTRADES on SVHN; to
8.5 for ClusTR+QTRADES on CIFAR100.
QTRADES. We initialize the adversary by adding uniform noise in [−, ] to the original instance,
computing Cross Entropy between the original and adversarial instances and following one step
of gradient ascent for Cross Entropy. The result of gradient ascent is always clipped so that the
adversarial instances lies in image space, i.e. [0, 1]n. The total loss with which the network is trained
is a weighted sum of the Clustering Loss and the Cross Entropy between the original and adversarial
instances. We cross validate over the regularization term λ balancing the two terms in Equation (5).
We set λ to 8 on CIFAR10, to 9.7 on SVHN, and to 2 on CIFAR100.
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Table 4: Performance of ClusTR+QTRADES on CIFAR10, CIFAR100 and SVHN. We report
the PGD Accuracy of ClusTR+QTRADES on more  Values where we show that the robustness of
the resultant model is agnostic from the choice of .
CIFAR10 SVHN CIFAR100
 PGD20 PGD100 PGD20 PGD100 PGD20 PGD100
2/255 81.99 81.54 87.48 87.47 60.15 59.77
16/255 57.67 57.05 80.04 80.00 33.32 33.25
25.5/255 35.88 34.98 71.56 71.45 17.76 17.65
Table 5: Comparison of training time on SVHN. Training time is computed on the same worksta-
tion using the same software platform (PyTorch [35]) and GPU (GTX 1080Ti).
Free AT TRADES QTRADES Magnet ClusTR ClusTR+QTRADES
Time (min.) 25 763 12 150 52 192
E Additional Experiments
E.1 Combining CE with Distance-Based Classifier
The robustness radius in Theorem 1 holds for any clustering-based classifier of features produced
by a Lipschitz-continuous function fθ. Therefore, we start by addressing the following question: if
robustness is the aim, can one replace the last layer of a nominally-trained DNN with a clustering-
based classifier to achieve robustness? Addressing this question is essential to establish the necessity
of enforcing clustering during training, i.e. training with ClusTR. To answer this question, we study
a nominally-trained ResNet18 on CIFAR10, which achieves an accuracy of 95.0%. We observe
that directly applying K-means on the representations of the penultimate layer, and performing
classification according to Equation (4) achieves an accuracy of 21.6%, i.e. a performance drop of
over 70%. As adversaries will aim at changing the classifier’s predictions, the highest adversarial
accuracy that this classifier can attain is upper bounded by 21.6%. This result demonstrates that
features learnt through nominal training are not spatially configured for clustering-based classification.
Hence, this result establishes that exploiting the benefits of clustering-based classification requires to
explicitly enforce clustering during DNN training.
E.2 Results of PGD Attacks with Other  Values.
Table 4 reports the adversarial accuracies ClusTR + QTRADES under PGD attacks with  ∈
{2/255, 16/255, 0.1} since we reported the extensive results and comparison for  = 8/255 in the main
paper. Note that the robustness of our model is not limited to a specific value of .
E.3 Training Time on SVHN
Analogous to Table 2, we report training time comparison for various methods in Table 5. The
reported times are the times it takes to for the models to converge based on the stopping criterion
discussed in the earlier section or toward the last epoch. Note that ClusTR converges significantly
faster than training with Magnet Loss with random initialization. Moreover, ClusTR+QTRADES
improves on TRADES, the-state-of-the-art, in both PGD test accuracy and in training time.
E.4 Ablation on D
ClusTR predicts the class of an input as a soft nearest cluster through Equation (4). The probabilities
can also be computed by only considering the D nearest clusters, as reported in the Experiments
Section. Next, we report the effect of varying D in terms of the natural and adversarial accuracies.
Figure 4 depicts the behavior of clean and adversarial accuracies with varying D on CIFAR10. We
observe that the effect of varying D on both CIFAR10 and SVHN is negligible (∼ 3%). The best
PGD accuracy for both CIFAR10 and SVHN under the strong 8/255−PGD20 attack was 77.04% and
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Figure 4: Effect of D on 8/255−PGD20 Test Accuracy. Note that with D = 1, i.e. the assumption
in our theoretical analysis, our methods outperforms the state-of-the-art. Moreover, it can be seen
that considering only about 20% of the total number of clusters yields the best performance.
85.33%, respectively (corresponding to D = 4). On the other hand, this effect seems to be stronger
on CIFAR100. It is worthwhile to mention that more than 50% of the choices of D yields better
robustness than the state of the art. Moreover, with D = 1 which is exact setup of our theoretical
result in Theorem 1, ClusTR+QTRADES surpasses the state of the art on all of the datasets by a
significant margin. Finally, the best 8/255−PGD20 accuracy on CIFAR100 is 53.25% with D = 60.
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